The FOMC in 1979: introducing reserve targeting by Richard W. Lang
RICHARD W. LANG
~‘IAJORchanges in the implementation of mone-
tary policy occurred in 1979. In accordance with the
Full-Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was
required to announce long-run ranges for monetary
growth in 1979 in a new format. In addition, the
FOMC had to adjust its one-year range forMl growth
to take into account the introduction of two financial
innovations in late 1978 — the automatic transfer
service (ATS) between savings and checking ac-
counts at banks nationwide and negotiable orders of
withdrawal (NOW) accounts in New York State.
The most important change in the implementation
of monetary policy, however, occurredin the FOMC’s
short-mn operating procedures. On October 6, 1979,
the Federal Reserve announced a series of actions to
“assure better control over the expansion of money
and bank credit, help curb speculative excesses in
financial, foreign exchange, and commodity markets,
and thereby serve to dampen inflationary forces,”1 The
most significant of these actions was the FOMC’s ap-
proval of a change in the day-to-day procedures used
to conduct monetary policy.
This action involves placing greater emphasis in
day-to-day operations on the supply of bank re-
serves and less emphasis on confining short-term
fluctuations in the federal funds rate.2
This announcement introduced a different strategy for
the conduct of open market operations — a strategy of
targeting on bank reserves rather than the federal
funds rate.
Note: Unless specified otherwise, citations throughout thi
5 paper are from either the “Record of Policy Actions of the
Federal Open Market Committee” or “Statements to Congress,”
Federal Reserve Bnlletjn (February 1979 through March 1980).
1
”Announcements: Monetary Policy Actions,” Federal Reserve
Bulletin (October 1979), p. 830.
This article discusses these modifications to the
implementation of monetary policy and summarizes
the decisions of the FOMC in 1979. The Committee’s
domestic policy directives are summarized in table 1.
Excerpts from the monthly “Record of Policy Actions
of the FOMC,” which provide a more detailed meet-
ing-by-meeting summary of FOMC discussions, ap-
pear in a supplement to this article.
LO?GRUN RANGES OF
MONETARY GROWTH
Since 1975 the FOMC has publicly announced one-
year growth ranges for the monetary aggregates (Ml,
M2, and M3). At that time, Congress requested in
House Concurrent Resolution 133 that the Board of
Governors consult with congressional committees on
a quarterly basis about the Federal Reserve System’s
objectives and plans for the ranges of growth of mone-
tary and credit aggregates over the next 12 months.
Such consultations became a requirement with the
Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977. The format of
these one-year ranges was altered in 1979, however,
under the requirements of the Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (also called the Hum-
phrey-Hawkins Act). At the same time, the FOMC
had to formulate monetary growth ranges that took
into account the introduction of nationwide ATS ac-
counts and New York NOW accounts.
The Humphrey-Hawkins Act
Before 1979 the FOMC reviewed and adopted one-
year growth ranges for several monetary and credit
aggregates each quarter and presented them to Con-
,gress. The period to which these growth ranges ap-
plied began with the previous quarter and ended in
the same quarter of the following year. For instance,
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Organization of the Committee in 1979
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Table 1 (continued)
Supplementary Footnotes — Dissents to FOMC Actions
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would be calculated, the level of Ml in the base pe-
riod would “drift” from quarter to quarter. Further-
more, since the FOMC frequently kept the same
numerical one-year ranges (e.g., keeping a 4 to 6
percent range from second quarter to second quarter)
despite deviations of Ml growth from that range in
the previous quarter, deviations of monetary growth
from their original ranges were essentially ignored
or “forgiven.”
The Humphrey-Hawkins Act requires the FOMC
to establish calendar-year growth ranges for monetary
and credit aggregates in February of each year. The
FOMC has chosen to establish these ranges from the
fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quar-
ter of the current year. The FOMC must review these
ranges in mid-year, although it may reconsider the
one-year ranges at any time.4 The Committee, how-
ever, may not change the period to which the one-
year ranges apply. Thus, the base period (the fourth
quarter) remains the same.
By requiring the FOMC to establish calendar-year
monetary growth ranges measured from an unchang-
ing base, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act eliminates “base
drift” and the “forgiveness principle” within each
calendar year. Nevertheless, these problems still can
occur from one year to the next because the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act requires the FOMC to
establish new one-year ranges each calendar year.
Thus, the FOMC would use the most recent fourth
quarter average level of the monetary aggregate as
the base.
ATS and New York NOW Accounts
Financial innovations in 1978 presented the FOMC
in 1979 with the difficult problem of assessing their
impact on the growth of various measures of money.
Starting November 1, 1978, commercial banks and
mutual savings banks were permitted to offer indi-
vidual customers an automatic transfer service (ATS)
between savings and checking accounts. This service
provides for the transfer of funds from a savings ac-
count to cover checks written against an individual’s
checking account. Consequently, the new ATS savings
accounts enable individuals to earn interest on funds
that previously might have been held in their check-
ing (demand deposit) accounts. Because of the in-
4At the time of the mid-year review of the one-year ranges,
the FOMC also establishes tentative ranges for the monetary
aggregates for the next year — measured from the fourth




centive to earn interest on checkable bank balances,
the Federal Reserve expected that many individuals
would use ATS savings accounts as a substitute for
holding balances in their checking accounts. Thus,
during a transition period in which demand deposits
were being transferred into ATS accounts, the growth
of ATS balances (which were not included in Ml)
was expected to reduce the growth of Ml (demand
deposits plus currency).5
A similar but smaller effect was expected to result
from the introduction of NOW accounts in New York
State. NOWs can be used by individuals in the same
manner as checks to make transactions, but balances
in NOW accounts earn interest as do savings accounts
and were not included in Ml,6 Upon congressional
approval, NOW accounts were extended to New York
State in November 1978; they had been introduced
much earlier in the New England states. The growth
of these accounts in New York also was expected to
reduce Ml growth during a transition period.
Chairman C. William Miller outlined the effect
of ATS accounts on the growth of Ml and the broader
monetary aggregates on July 28, 1978 when he an-
nounced to Congress the one-year ranges established
at the July 1978 FOMC meeting. He noted that, dur-
ing the transition period in which bank customers
adjust to ATS, Ml growth would be lowered while
M2 and M3 growth would be little affected,7
Although discussed at the July meeting, the
scheduled introduction of ATS accounts in Novem-
ber 1978 first affected the FOMC’s decision about the
one-year monetary growth ranges at the October 17,
1978 meeting. A majority of the Committee voted to
retain the existing ranges for M2 and M3 for the pe-
riod from third quarter 1978 to third quarter 1979
(111/78 to 111/79)~The Committee also indicated
that it expected Ml growth to be within a range of 2
to 6 percent during that period, “depending in part
on the speed and extent of transfers from demand to
savings deposits resulting from the introduction of
ATS”8 This expected range of Ml growth was both
lower and wider than the one adopted in July. The
7
Chairmaa C, William Miller, “Statements” (August 1978),
p. 646.
~“Record” (December 1978), p. 953.
5
For a more detailed analysis of the effect of ATS on the
money supply process, see John A. Tatom and Richard W.
Lang, “Automatic Transfers and the Money Supply Process,’
this Review (February 1979), pp. 2-10.
6
NOW balances at commercial banks were included in old
M2, while NOW balances at thrift institutions were included
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FOMC, however, placed less emphasis on Ml than
on M2 and M3.9
When the one-year ranges were established at the
February 6, 1979 meeting under the requirements
of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the FOMC felt more
confident about the magnitude of the effects of both
ATS and New York NOW accounts on Ml growth
and again gave equal emphasis to Ml growth. A staff
analysis indicated that the growth of ATS and New
York NOW accounts would lower Ml growth over
1979 by about 3 percentage points.’0 The FOMC used
this estimate in formulating its range for Ml growth
over the period from IV/78 to IV/79.
The FOMC’s discussion at the February meeting
stressed that monetary growth ranges be chosen that
were consistent with a reduction in the rate of
inflation.” The Committee decided at this meeting
to lower the monetary growth ranges. The ranges also
were widened to 3 percentage points, compared with
their previous width of 2,5 percentage points)2 This
widening reflected, in part, “the special factors [ATS
and New York NOW accountsj expected to influence
monetary growth and the uncertainties with respect to
the magnitude of their impact.”18 The M2 and M3
ranges were lowered to 5 to 8 percent and 6 to 9 per-
cent for the period IV/78 to IV/79, respectively, from
previous ranges of 6.5 to 9 and 7.5 to 10 percent for
the period 111/78 to 111/79 (table 1). The FOMC
adopted an Ml range of 1.5 to 4.5 percent from IV/78
to IV/79 and noted that this “range allowed for the
possibility of a significant deceleration of growth from
the pace of recent years” even after allowance for the
estimated 3 percentage-point slowing in Ml growth
due to the effects of ATS and New York NOW
accounts.’4
Two Committee members, however, felt that the
13 to 4.5 percent Ml range allowed for too rapid
Ml growth. In fact, they felt that this range repre-
sented a higher, not a lower, range than the previously
adopted Mlranges.
Messrs. Wallich and Willes dissented from this
action because, with the Committee’s objective of
9
Chairman C. William Miller, “Statements” (November 1978),
p. 846; and Lang, “The FOMC in 1978,’ p. 14.
10
”Record” (April 1979), p. 330.
“Ibid.
~ the case of Ml, recall that the 2 to 6 percent range from
111/78 to 111/79 was not typical of ranges in earlier periods,
The Ml range in effect for most of 1978 was 4 to 6½
percent.
~“Record” (April 1979), p. 331.
l4Ibid
slowing the rate of inflation in mind, they pre-
ferred to specify lower ranges for growth of the
monetary aggregates. Mr. Willes believed that the
range adopted for Ml, after allowance for the effects
of ATS and a possible further downward shift in the
public’s demand for money, represented an increase
from the ranges that had been adopted during 1978.
Mr. Wallich thought that, after allowance for the
expansion in repurchase agreements and Eurodollars
in addition to the other forces affecting growth of
MI, the range adopted represented too much of an
increase from the ranges set earlier.’5
To understand why the 1979 Ml range could be
viewed as higher than previous ranges of growth, one
must consider what it would have been without the
effect of ATS and New York NOW accounts. The
FOMC used an estimate that growth of these accounts
would lower Ml growth by 3 percentage points. This
means that 3 percentage points were subtracted from
the lower and upper ends of an initial Ml range to
obtain a lower limit of 1.5 percent and an upper limit
of 4.5 percent. The initial range implicit in this calcu-
lation is 4.5 to 7.5 percent. One can view this 4.5 to
7.5 percent range as the Ml range that would have
prevailed if ATS and New York NOW accounts had
no effect at all on Ml growth. The upper end of this
range represented almost the same rate of Ml growth
as actually occurred in the previous two years — Ml
increased 7.9 percent from IV/76 to IV/77 and 7.2
percent from IV/77 to IV/78.
Furthermore, this 4.5 to 7.5 percent range repre-
sented an increase in the upper limit of the Ml range
compared with those adopted in 1977 and 1978, when
the upper limits were no higher than 6,5 percent. If
the FOMC had adjusted the Ml range that had
been in effect during most of 1978—4 to 6.5 percent’°
— for the estimated 3-percentage-point effect of ATS
and New York NOW account growth, the resulting
Ml range would have been 1 to 3.5 percent from
IV/78 to IV/79 instead of the 1.5 to 4.5 percent Ml
range actually adopted.
Mid’Year Review
The Humphrey-Hawkins Act required the FOMC
to transmit to Congress in July a review of its 1979
monetary growth ranges as well as a preliminary in-
dication of its ranges for 1980. At the July 11,
1979 meeting, a staff analysis indicated that “shifts
in funds from demand deposits to savings accounts
with automatic transfer services and to NOW ac-
‘~Ibid,, pp. 331-32.
t6See footnote 12 and the earlier discussion of the Ml range
adopted atthe October 17, 1978 meeting.
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counts had retarded the annual rate of growth of Ml
by the assumed amount of about 3 percentage points
in the first quarter of 1979 but by only about 1.5 per-
centage points in the second quarter ‘~ Uncer-
tainty about the further growth of ATS accounts was
compounded by an April federal court ruling that
barred these accounts as of January 1, 1980, unless
Congress enacted legislation authorizing them.’8
At the July meeting, most Committee members
favored ranges that reflected a continuation of the
policy stance adopted in February.’9 The Committee
decided to retain the same ranges for 1979 that it had
adopted in February and tentatively indicated that
these ranges also would be appropriate for 1980
(table 1). Although the FOMC continued to use the
estimate that the growth of ATS and New York
NOW accounts would reduce Ml growth by about
3 percentage points in 1979, it “also agreed that actual
growth in Ml might vary in relation to its range to
the extent of any deviation from that [3 percentage-
point] estimate.”2°In this regard the Committee noted
that monetary growth in 1980 “might be within the
same ranges” as in 1979, but that this was especially
tentative in light of the uncertain legislative and
judicial position of ATS and other interest-earning
transactions accounts 21
The Ml range for 1979 was indeed modified later
in the year. At the special meeting held on October
6, 1979, the “Record of Policy Actions” noted that
the recent growth of ATS and New York NOW ac-
counts implied that their effect on Ml growth was
smaller than the original 3 percentage-point estimate.
It now appeared that expansion of such accounts
would reduce measured growth of Ml over the year
by about 1.5 percentage points. After allowance for
the deviation from the earlier estimate, the equiv-
alent range for Ml was 3 to 6 percent.
22
The revised 3 to 8 percent range for Ml growth
from IV/78 to IV/79 (table 1) again translates into
an initial range of Ml growth of 4.5 to 7.5 percent
(obtained by adding 1.5 percentage points to the
MARCH 1980
FOMC’s revised Ml range). In effect, the FOMC in
October 1979 continued to use an estimate of the re-
duction of Ml growth due to the growth of ATS and
New York NOW accounts to mark down the 1979 Ml
range from an initial range of 4.5 to 7.5 percent. This
latter range was higher and wider than the Ml ranges
adopted in 1978, and can be interpreted as the range
that would have prevailed if the growth of ATS and
New York NOW accounts had no effect at all on Ml
growth.
Actual Money Growth and the
One-Year Ranges
Crowth rates of the monetary aggregates were be-
low their one-year ranges in the first quarter of the
year, but were above these ranges in the second and
third quarters. Thus, after falling below their ranges
in the first quarter, the levels of the monetary aggre-
gates were within their ranges by the end of the sec-
ond quarter and were above or near the tops of
their ranges by the end of the third quarter (charts
1 and 2).
Rapid growth of Ml in the third quarter brought
the level of Ml above the original 1.5 to 4.5 percent
range. After readjusting the Ml range for the lower
estimate of the effect of ATS and New York NOW
accounts, however, the level of Ml was near the top
of the revised 3 to 6 percent range at the end of the
third quarter (chart 1). Nevertheless, it was clear to
the FOMC in early October that a continuation of
monetary growth at third-quarter rates would result in
growth rates for the year that would exceed the
1979 ranges.~
The Committee’s desire to hold growth of the
monetary aggregates within their 1979 ranges was the
principal reason for the October 8 changes in short-
run operating procedures.24 This shift in procedures,
discussed below in detail, apparently succeeded in
slowing growth of all the monetary aggregates in the
fourth quarter. As a result, both Ml and M3 in 1979
were kept within the FOMC’s adopted ranges of
growth, while M2 was slightly above the upper limit
of its range. From IV/78 to IV/79, Ml increased
about 5.5 percent, M2 about 8.3 percent, and M3
about 8 percent.
It must be emphasized, however, that the 5.5 per-
cent Ml growth in 1979 is not comparable to Ml
2~jbidp. 974.
24Ibid.
17”Record” (September 1979), p. 752.
‘
8
Congress temporarily extended authorization of ATS ac-
counts through March 1980 in order to allow mnre time to
consider permanent legislation.
19”Record” (September 1979), p. 753.
2OIbid,, p. 754.
2tThe retention of the 1.5 to 4.5 percent range for Ml growth
again was cause for dissent by Covernor Wallich. He still
felt that this range was too high given the Committee’s
objective of slowing inflation. (Mr. Willes was not a voting
member at this meeting.) Ibid.
22”Record” (December 1979), p. 973.
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Chart 1
Ml Range for Period IV/78 to IV/79
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growth in previous years. For example, to compare Ml
growth rates for 1979 and 1978, one must adjust the
1979 growth rate by the estimated effect of ATS and
New York NOW accounts. Assuming that Ml growth
in 1979 was reduced by 1.5 percentage points — the
figure used by the FOMC in October to adjust the
Ml range — one must add this amount to the 5.5
percent rate of growth in 1979. This results in a7
percent growth rate, about the same as the 7.2 percent
ratein 1978.
SHORT-RUN OPERATING PROCEDURES
Prior to October 6, 1979, FOMC short-mn operat-
ing procedures were carried out as in the previous
several years.25 At each meeting, the FOMC set an
intermeeting range for the federal funds rate along
with two-month tolerance ranges for Ml and M2
25
Lang, “The FOMC in 1978,” pp. 2-10. For an historical per-
spective on the FOMC’s short-run operating procedures, see
Henry C. Wallich and Peter M. Keir, ‘The Role of Operating
Cuides in U.S. Monetary Policy: A Historical Review,” Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin (September 1979), pp. 679-91.
Rollo Scale
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Oorl 2
Ranges for M2, M3, and Bank Credit for




























APE. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC. JAN. PRO MAE. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT OCT. NOV. SEC. JAN. PEE. MAE,
8978 1979







growth (table 1 and charts 3 and 4). Within the fed-
eral funds rate range, the Committee specified an
initial level of the funds rate that was thought to be
consistent with the short-mn ranges set for Ml and
M2. The two-month ranges for Ml and M2, in turn,
were intended to provide an indicator to determine
when changes in the federal funds rate should be
made (subject to its own range). These short-run
ranges were specified over moving two-month periods.
For example, the FOMC at its February 6, 1979
meeting specified ranges for Ml and M2 growth over
the February-March period. At the March 20 meet-
ing it then set new ranges for the March-April pe-
riod (table 1). If the two-month growth rates of Ml
and M2 appeared to deviate from their respective
ranges — either from the midpoints of their ranges
or from their upper or lower limits — the level of the
federal funds rate could be changed within its range,
or the Committee could reconsider the range.2°
20
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Prior to October 6, the domestic policy directives
followed the same general format as in 1978 with
regard to short-run operating procedures. Less than
three weeks after adopting such a directive at
its September 18 meeting,27 this format was aban-
doned when the FOMC instituted its new short-mn
operating procedures. The new procedures were
adopted at a special FOMC meeting called by Chair-
man Volcker, “to consider actions that might be
taken, in conjunction with actions being contemplated
by the Board of Governors, to improve control over
the expansion of money and bank credit in the light
of developing speculative excesses in financial and
commodity markets and additional evidence of strong
inflationary forces in the economy.”28
Mter the September 18, 1979 meeting, incoming
data indicated that the economy was stronger
than had been expected, while both consumer
and producer price indexes continued to record
double-digit increases. In the foreign exchange mar-
kets, the dollar declined substantially despite large
purchases of dollars by the United States and by for-
eign central banks. This decline was attributed to the
continuing rapid U.S. inflation rate.2° Furthermore,
speculation in gold markets had increased between
August and October 1979 and had apparently spread
to other metal and commodity markets, as evidenced
by a more than 50 percent increase in September in an
industrial commodity price index. This was attributed
to “a general rise in inflationary expectations that
tended to feed on themselves.”30 Against this back-
ground (see Supplement, meeting of October 6, 1979),
the Federal Reserve announced several policy actions
— a 1 percentage-point increase in the discount rate,
a new marginal reserve requirement on certain
managed liabilities of member banks, and a change in
the FOMC’s short-run operating procedures.3’
The FOMC was especially concerned with the ex-
pansion of both the monetary aggregates and bank
credit, which had been increasing at rapid rates after
the first quarter of 1979 (charts 1 and 2). The issue
of how to slow monetary growth to keep thc aggre-
2~”Record”(November 1979), pp. 912-13.
25
”Record” (December 1979), p. 972.
29




For a more detailed description of the new marginal reserve
requirements on managed liabilities, see “Annonncements:
Monetary Policy Actions,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (October
1979), pp. 830-32.
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gates within their 1979 ranges was the catalyst for
the change in the FOMC’s short-mn operating
procedures.
The principal reason advanced for shifting to an
operating procedure aimed at controlling the supply
of hank reserves more directly was that it would
provide greater assurance that the Committee’s ob-
jectives for monetary growth could be achieved.32
The Committee recognized that the relationship be-
tween bank reserve and monetary growth was
not precise; there was no guarantee that the shift in
emphasis would be successful in reducing monetary
growth over the last few months of 1979. The Com-
mittee also recognized that this change in short-run
procedures could be accompanied initially by sub-
stantial increases in interest rates and that movements
in interest rates would be more uncertain.33 After
some debate between members who favored the
change in short-mn operating procedures and
those who preferred continuing to direct open mar-
ket operations toward controffing the level of the
federal funds rate, the Committee unanimously ap-
proved a modification of the domestic policy direc-
tive. Greater emphasis was placed on controlling the
T2”Record” (December 1979), p. 974~
~~Ibid., p. 976.
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volume of bank reserves and less on
controlling fluctuations in the federal
funds rate.34
Effect on the Domestic
Policy Directive
The wording of the domestic policy
directive was altered substantially by the
FOMC’s new operating procedures. The
directive adopted at the October 6 meet-
ing stated:
In the short run, the Committee
seeks to restrain expansion of reserve
aggregates to a pace consistent with
deceleration in growth of Ml, M2, and
M3 in the fourth quarter of 1979 to
rates that would hold growth of these
monetary aggregates over the whole
period from the fourth quarter of 1978
to the fourth quarter of 1979 within
the Committee’s longer-run ranges, pro-
vided that in the period before the
next regular meeting the weekly aver-
age federal funds rate remains within
a range of 11½ to 15½percent. The
Committee will consider the need for
supplementary instructions if it appears
that operations to restrain expansion
of reserve aggregates would maintain the federal
funds rate near the upper limit of its range.
35
This section of the directive — which deals with the
FOMC’s short-mn objectives — was not specific about
the short-run growth rates of Ml and M2 that the
FOMC desired to achieve. The “Record of Policy Ac-
tions” of the October 6 meeting, however, was more
precise.
Specifically, the Committee instructed the Manager
to restrain expansion of bank reserves to a pace
consistent with growth from September to December
at an annual rate on the order of 4.5 percent in Ml
and about 7.5 percent in M2 and M3, provided that
in the period before the next regular meeting the
federal funds rate remained generally within a range
of 11½to 15½percent. Because such rates of
expansion would result in growth of the monetary
aggregates in the upper part of their ranges for
the year, the Committee also agreed that over
the three-month period somewhat slower growth
would be acceptable.3°
Wording almost identical to that in the October 6


















November 20, 1979 meeting.37 Again, more specific
short-mn objectives for Ml and M2 growth were
stated in the “Record” of that meeting (table 1).38
At the January 8-9, 1980 meeting, however, specific
short-mn objectives for Ml and M2 growth were ex-
plicitly incorporated into the domestic policy directive.
In the short run, the Committee seeks expansion
of reserve aggregates consistent with growth over
the first quarter of 1980 at an annual rate between
4 and 5 percent for Ml and on the order of 7 per-
cent for M2, provided that in the period before
the next regular meeting the weekly average federal
funds rate remains within a range of 11½ to 15½
percent.39
Although only three new domestic policy directives
had been released by the time this article was writ-
ten, a few observations can be made about the
FOMC’s new operating procedures. First, the
FOMC no longer targets on a specific level
of the federal funds rate as its short-mn operating
objective. Second, the 4 percentage-point range of
the federal funds rate that has been maintained in
the directive since October 6 is substantially larger
““Record” (January 1980), p. 46.
T8Ibid., p. 45.
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than the one-half to three-quarter percentage-point
ranges established previously (table 1). The absence
of a specific federal funds rate objective and the
wider range have been evident in both inter-day and
intra-day fluctuations of the federal funds rate, which
changed radically after October 6.
In the FOMC’s new directives, desired growth rates
of Ml and M2 over two- or three-month periods are
established in terms of specific rates of change, or, in
the case of the January 1980 directive, a 1 percentage-
point range. In contrast, short-mn ranges of Ml and
M2 growth typically were specified in terms of 3
percentage-point ranges prior to October 6. Further-
more, the short-mn Ml and M2 ranges previously
were specified as “tolerance ranges” to be used by the
Manager of the System Open Market Account only
as an indicator “for determining when changes in the
funds rate were appropriate 40 Under current
short-mn operating procedures, however,the Manager
is directed to achieve growth rates of bank reserves
consistent with specified growth rates of Ml and ?s12,
provided that the federal funds rate remains within a
broad range.
The Manager of the System Open Market Account,
who is responsible for achieving the FOMC’s objec-
tives, has had to change the focus of domestic open
market operations from attaining specific levels of the
funds rate to maintaining growth of “reserve aggre-
gates” consistent with specified rates of Ml and M2
growth. These reserve aggregates, however, are not
specified in either the directive or the “Records of
Policy Actions.” The FOMC votes on growth rates of
the monetary aggregates, not the reserve aggregates.
Consequently, it is left to the staffs of the Board of
Governors and the New York Federal Reserve’s Open
Market Desk to establish guidelines for the growth
of these reserve aggregates.
Domestic Open Market Operations
and Reserve Targeting
Until recently, information was sketchy about the
Federal Reserve’s new procedures for implementing
monetary policy. Although various Federal Reserve
officials had mentioned that the Open Market Desk
was tracking a “family” of reserve aggregates rather
than a single aggregate, it was not clear which meas-
ures were included in this “family” nor how the Desk
related growth of these aggregates to the FOMC’s
monetary growth objectives. A staff paper released by
the Board of Governors on January 31, 1980 clarified
~°“Record”(August 1978), p. 663.
these matters substantially.41 The staff paper outlined
the new operating procedure in eight principal steps,
highlights of which are presented in exhibit 1.
The process of translating the FOMC’s desired
rates of short-mn monetary growth into weekly tar-
get levels of total reserves, monetary base, and non-
borrowed reserves are described in steps 1 through
4o fexhibit 1. Although the staff paper makes it
clear that the “overall” objective of the Open Mar-
ket Desk is to control the growth of total reserves
(step 5, exhibit 1), it also makes clear that the im-
mediate short-mn operating objective is to control the
growth of nonborrowed reserves (step 6, exhibit 1).
Thus, the Manager of the Desk directs the purchase
and sale of government securities in order to attain
some pattem of changes in (or path of) the level of
nonborrowed reserves between FOMC meetings. At-
taining the desired path for nonborrowed reserves
will not necessarily yield the desired path for total
reserves, however, since the actual path of total re-
serves also depends on the behavior of member bank
borrowing at the discount window. For example, if
borrowings are larger than the level assumed in con-
structing the path for nonborrowed reserves, then
total reserves will be above the desired path even
though nonborrowed reserves are on their desired
path.
In the event that total reserves are above the
Desk’s desiredpath, the staff paper indicates that cer-
tain adjustments could be made to bring the growth
of total reserves back to the desired path — either a
lowering of the nonborrowed reserve path or an in-
crease in the discount rate (step 7, exhibit 1). The
first adjustment may be made by the staff of the
Board of Governors in conjunction with the Manager
of the System Open Market Account. The second
adjustment, however, must be initiated by the Boards
of Directors of the district Federal Reserve Banks,
subject to the approval of the Board of Governors,
According to the staff paper, neither adjustment
would be made until the growth of total reserves
had been overshooting the desired path for some
time,
The staff paper’s analysis of the effects of open
market operations on reserve and money growth un-
der the new operating procedures is essentially the
same as such analyses under the old procedures.
According to this staff paper, control of nonborrowed
reserves and the discount rate affect the growth of
4r’The New Federal Reserve Technical Procedures for Con-
trolling Money,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, January 31, 1980.
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Exhibit 1
Excerpts from “The New Federal Reserve Technical Procedures
for Controlling Money”
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total reserves and money by influencing the demand
for bank reserves and the demand for money (steps
6 and 7, exhibit 1). Open market operations that re-
duce nonborrowed reserves tend to increase inter-
est rates, which (after a lag) reduce the demand for
money, thereby reducing the demand for bank re-
serves used to support money. A rise in the discount
rate tends to increase other market interest rates,
which (after a lag) again reduce the demand for
money and the demand for bank reserves., Deviations
in the growth of total reserves or money from desired
rates are controlled, then, by inducing changes in
interest rates which affect the demands for money
and bank reserves. This analysis of controlling money
growth is comparable to Board staff analyses of the
FOMC’s pre-October 6 procedures for controlling
money growth,
An example of this comparability appears in an
article by Governor Wailich and Peter Keir which
appeared in the September 1979 Federal Reserve Bul-
letin,42 Written before the introduction of reserve tar-
geting, this article discussed control of the monetary
aggregates via interest rate changes under the old
operating procedures. In particular, the authors ex-
plain the problems of correcting deviations of money
growth from desired rates in terms of the pre-October
6 procedures~
When incoming data show a sudden marked ac-
celeration or slowing in money growth rates, the
Committee must decide whether the change is a
temporary aberration likely soon to be reversed,
or a more fundamental change in money demands
that stems from a basic adjustment in the perform-
ance of the economy, If the Committee acted im-
mediately to counter an observed change in money
growth, and the change then proved to be temporary,
the action could be destabilizing and require a sub-
sequent offsetting adjustment. Since Committee
aetion.s affect the public’s willingness to hold money
with a log through their influence on interest rates,
such attempts at fine tuning could produce perverse
results, [Emphasis added,]
To minimize this risk, the FOMC typically has
adopted an intermediate position.43
Thus, the overall framework for analyzing the effects
of open market operations on reserve and money
growth — that open market operations change inter-
est rates, which affect the demand for money, thereby
influencing the demand for bank reserves used to
support money—has not changed. What has changed
under the new operating procedures is the FOMC’s
42Wailich and Keir, “The Role of Operating Guides in US.
Monetary Policy,” pp. 679-91.
srlbud, p. 688.
emphasis on restricting interest rate fluctuations and,
consequently, the Desk’s ability to respond to devia-
tions of money growth from its desired path.
The interest rate constraints placed on the Desk
under the old procedures are described by Wallich
and Keir:
When the performance of the money supply ap-
pears to be deviating from the Committee’s stated
two-month ranges, the Manager of the System Ac-
count is still constrained in his efforts to offset these
deviations by a federal funds rate proviso He can
initiate countering open market purchases or sales
only so long as these operations, or other market
factors, do not push the weekly average federal funds
rate outside its specified range, generally 50 to 100
basis points wide. If growth rates for Ml and M2
appear to be remaining outside the Committee’s
desired ranges, and the Manager’s actions to counter
this deviation have moved the funds rate to the
upper or lower limit of its range, he must request
new instructions from the Committee.44
Prior to October 6, the Committee generally was un-
willing to allow large movements of the federal funds
rate that would have been sufficient to achieve de-
sired rates of monetary growth within relatively short
periods of time. (Recall that the FOMC’s two-month
ranges of Ml and M2 growth were not themselves
treated as short-run targets, but as indicators for de-
termining when to change the federal funds rate.)
Confronted with an unexpected overshoot or under-
shoot of its money growth targets, the Committee
has taken action that neither fully ignores nor fully
responds to the miss, until the underlying growth
tendency can be differentiated from the “noise” of
aberrations in the data. This approach poses some
risk that needed countercyclical policy actions will
be less timely than desired, But the Committee be-
lieves that the accentuated volatility in short-term in-
terest rates likely to result from efforts at instanta-
neous fine tuning of the aggregates poses a greater
risk.4°
Like the old procedures, the new procedures also
do not attempt to “fine tune” the short-run growth of
the monetary aggregates. As pointed out in the staff
paper (exhibit 1), neither deviations of reserve growth
nor deviations of money growth from their desired
paths will necessarily be responded to immediately.
Adjustments of the nonborrowed reserve path or the
discount rate would occur only after overshooting or
undershooting of the desired paths persisted. What
is different about the new procedures is that the Desk
no longer operates under as restrictive a federal funds
rate constraint. The range for the federal funds rate
“ibud., p. 686.
~ p. 688.
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has been widened to 400 basis points — compared
with the typical pre-October 6 range of 50 to 100 basis
points — and the FOMC no longer specifies a target
level of the funds rate (table l).46 Consequently, the
Desk has greater flexibility in offsetting deviations of
reserve and money growth from their desired paths.
In effect, these new procedures allow the Manager
of the System Open Market Account to stabilize
growth of nonborrowed reserves within narrower
limits. The old procedures, in contrast, forced the
Manager to keep the federal funds rate within nar-
row limits, which resulted in wider fluctuations in
the growth of non-borrowed reserves.
The Desk’s implementation of the FOMC’s policy
directives prior to October 6 were described in 1977
by the Manager of the System Open Market Account
as short-mn accommodation of the public’s demand
for money.
The FOMC’s instructions to the Manager of the
System Open Market Account regarding the manage-
ment of bank reserves provide — to a considerable
extent — for the accommodation of the public’s de-
mand for money in the short run, while at the same
time prescribing a response when growth of money
appears inconsistent with the Committee’s long-term
objectives.47
For example, upward pressure on the federal funds
rate was viewed as reflecting an increase in the de-
mand for money. The Desk “accommodated” this in-
creased demand by supplying bank reserves to keep
the funds rate constant. If the old short-run operat-
ing procedures could be described as “accommoda-
tive,” the current procedures — under which the Desk
attempts to stay on some growth path of bank re-
serves — can be described as “less accommodative” of
changes in the demand for money.
THE YEAR AHEAD
The major changes in the implementation of mone-
tary policy in 1979 will continue to influence mone-
tary policy actions in 1980. Chairman Voicker, as
46
h fact, on March 7, 1980, the FOMC widened the funds
rate range to 650 basis poh~s — 11½to 18 percent. See,
“Record of Policy Actions,” Federal Reserve Press Release
(March 21, 1980), p. 16; forthcoming in the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin (April 1980).
4~”TheImplementation of Monetary Policy in 1976,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin (April 1977), p. 326, This article was
adapted from a report submitted to the FOMC by Alan H.
Holmes and Peter D. Stern!ight, Manager and Deputy Man-
ager of the System Open Market Account, respectively. John
S. Hill and Christopher J. McCurdy were primarily respon-
sible for its preparation.
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quired by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, announced
new one-year ranges for monetary growth on Febru-
asy 20, 1980, for the period from IV/79 to IV/80.
These new ranges were formulated in terms of the
recently redefined monetary aggregates — M1A, M1B,
new M2, andnew
The M1A definition of the money stock is the same
as old Ml except that it excludes demand deposits
held by foreign commercial banks and official institu-
tions. The M1B definition includes M1A plus other
checkable deposits.4° These deposits include NOW
and ATS accounts, credit union share drafts, and de-
mand deposits at thrift institutions,
The construction of MlB as an alternative to M1A
was an attempt to avoid the problem of interpreting
old Ml growth when financial innovations such as
ATS and New York NOW accounts occurred. The
difference in growth between M1B and M1A is in-
dicative of the problems the FOMC faced in evaluat-
ing old Mi growth in 1979 relative to previous years.
From IV/78 to IV/79, M1A increased 5.5 percent—
the same as old Ml — which represented a reduction
in growth from its 7,4 percent increase in the previous
year.5°In contrast, M1B increased in 1979 at about
the same rate as in the previous year — 8 percent
from IV/78 to IV/79 compared with 8.2 percent
from IV/77 to IV/78. The difference in growth be-
tween M1A and M1B reflected the growth of New
York NOW accounts and nationwide ATS accounts,
for which the FOMC in 1979 attempted to adjust
when adopting a one-year range of growth for old
Mi.51 As this article went to press, Congress approved
proposed legislation to allow nationwide use of NOW
accounts. This could cause M1A and M1B again to
grow at substantially different rates over a transition
period. The possibility of nationwide NOW accounts
was the primary reason that the Board of Governors
adopted these two measures of Mi.52
The redefinition of the monetary aggregates also
alters the FOMC’s choice of short-run operating tar-
45
”Monetary Policy Report to Congress,” Federal Reserve Bul-
letin (March 1980), pp. 177-78; and “The Redefined Mone-
tary Aggregates,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (February 1980),
pp.97-114.
49For a detailed description of all the new monetary aggregates
and their relationship to the old measures, see “The Rede-
fined Monetary Aggregates;” or R, W. Hater, “The New
Monetary Aggregates,” this Review (February 1980), pp.
25-32.
~°OldMl growth in 1978 was also about the same as M 1A
growth —7.2 percent from P//77 to IV/78,
S1”The Redefined Monetary Aggregates,” p. 102.
S2Ibid,, p. 100.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
gets in 1980. Because data on M1A and M1B are
available weekly, while data on new M2 and M3 are
available only monthly, the FOMC’s short-run ranges
of monetary growth are being specified in terms of
MM and M1B.59 Consequently, the Desk must now
formulate intermeeting paths of total and nonbor-
rowed reserves consistent with the FOMC’s short-mn
ranges of M1A and M1B growth.
The introduction of reserve targeting in 1979 marks
53
”Record of Policy Actions of the FOMC: Meeting Held on
February 5, 1980,” Federal Reserve Press Release (March
21, 1980), p. 14, forthcoming in the Federal Reserve Bulle-
tin (April 1980).
This supplement consists of selected excerpts from
the “Record of Policy Actions” for each of the FOMC
meetings in 1979, Each “Record” includes analyses of
current and projected economic developments, discus-
sions of current policy actions, and long- and short-
run operating instructions issued by the FOMC to the
Trading Desk. The complete text of each “Record of
Policy Actions” appears in issues of the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin and “Records” for the entire year are
published in the Annual Report of the Board of
Governors.
Meeting Held on February 8, 1979
By late December, staff projections suggested that
growth in M2 over the December-January period
would be at an annual rate well below the lower limit
of the range of tolerance specified for that aggregate
and growth in Ml would be in the lower portion of its
range oftolerance.
These developments pointed to a reduction in the ob-
jective for the federal funds rate toward the 9% percent
lower limit of the specified range. However, on December
29 the Committee voted to modify its directive by calling
for open market operations directed at maintaining the
weekly average federal funds rate at about 10 percent or
slightly above, This action was taken in view of uncer-
tainties surrounding the interpretation of the behavior of
the monetary aggregates and in light of domestic economic
conditions and developments in domestic and interna-
tional financial markets. On January 12 the Committee
held a telephone conference to review the situation and
MARCH 1980
the beginning of a different approach to the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. The effectiveness of the
new short-run operating procedures in controlling
monetary growth, and these procedures’ effects (or
side-effects) on the economy, can be evaluated ade-
quately only over a longer period of time. Growth of
the monetary aggregates decelerated between October
and January of this year, in line with the FOMC’s ob-
jectives. Nevertheless, analysts undoubtedly will give
greater weight to monetary growth in 1980 — relative
to the FOMC’s new one-year ranges — in evaluating
the effectiveness of the new operating procedures.
to consider whether supplementary
needed, but no change was made in
the Manager.
Most market interest rates declined on balance during
the interrneeting period. Factors apparently contributing
to this development included a market sentiment that
further tightening in monetary policy had become less
likely in light of the behavior of the monetary aggregates
and the better performance of the dollar in foreign ex-
change markets. Another influence appeared to be the re-
cent modest growth of total business credit demands.
With respect to the economic situation and outlook,
most members of the committee expressed little or no dis-
agreement with the staff projection of a marked slowing
in the expansion by the second quarter of 1979 and of a
sustained slow rate of growth over the rest of the year
accompanied by some increase in the rate of unemploy-
ment, However, a few members questioned whether a
very slow pace of growth was sustainable and suggested
that the onset of a recession before the end of the year,
with a larger increase in the unemployment rate, was the
more likely development. Other members thought that
over the past few months the probabilities of the develop-
ment of a recession before the end of this year had de-
clined somewhat, It was also observed that expansion
might prove to be stronger than projected by the staff,
especially if businessmen believed that effective steps were
being taken to moderate the rate of inflation.
The members continued to anticipate a relatively rapid
rise in average prices. Inflation was viewed as a distortion
that could contribute to the development of a recession,
and it was noted that forecasters typically had underesti-
mated the strength of inflationary forces. In this connec-
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lion, it was observed that the economy was operating at
a higher rate in relation to its potential than had been
thought earlier.
In the Committee’s discussion, stress was placed on
the importance of adopting [one-year] ranges for mone-
tary growth over the year ahead that would be consistent
with a reduction in the rate of inflation, thereby reinforc-
ing the governmental actions over recent months in pur-
suit ofthat objective.
In the discussion of policy for the period immediately
ahead, most members of the Committee favored directing
operations initially toward maintaining the money market
conditions currently prevailing, as indicated by a federal
funds rate of 10 percent or slightly higher, but some senti-
ment was expressed for a slight additional firming in
money market conditions. The views of the members dif-
fered primarily with respect to the influence that the
incoming evidence concerning growth of the monetary
aggregates should have on the objective for the funds rate
later in the period before the next meeting.
Meeting Held on March 20, 1979
In January and February growth of total credit at U.S.
commercial banks accelerated considerably from its re-
duced pace during late 1978. Expansion in business loans
was unusually strong, and banks also added substantially
to their holdings of securities.
Ml declined in both January and February, M2
changed little, and M3 grew at a relatively slow rate. With
interest rates remaining high, the behavior of all three
monetary aggregates was affected by unusuallylarge shifts
of funds from deposits to money market mutual funds and
other liquid assets. The weakness in Ml also reflected the
effects of continuing movements of funds from demand
deposits to savings deposits associated with the recently
authorized automatic transfer service (ATS) and negoti-
able orders of withdrawal (NOW) accounts in New York
State.
At the beginning of March, projections suggested that
over the February-March period Ml would grow at a rate
moderately below the lower limit of the range established
by the Committee and M2 would grow at a rate just
below the lower limit of its range. In a special telephone
meeting on March 2, the Committee instructed the Man-
ager to continue aiming for a weekly average federal funds
rateof 10 percent or slighfly higher.
Most market interest rates rose moderately on balance
during the intenneeting period, after having declined in
January.
In the Committee’s discussion of the current economic
situation, attention was drawn to the more rapid expan-
sion in output of goods and services in the fourth quarter
of 1978 than had been anticipated. The Commerce De-
partment had just released a second upward revision in
its estimate of growth in real gross national product in
that quarter, and it was observed that the rate of resource
utilization therefore was higher than had been thought
earlier, accounting in part for the recent intensification of
upward pressures on prices.
At the same time, it was noted, developments since the
turn of the year were apparently mixed, contributing to
increased uncertainty.
Many members of the Committee thought that the staff
was overly optimistic in projecting continued, if sluggish,
growth in real CNP throughout the second half of 1979;
they believed that the chances of a recession beginning
before the end of the year or in early 1980 were fairly
high. The recent increase in the price of oil, the accelera-
tion of the overall rise in prices, and the sluggish growth
of the monetary aggregates over the latest five months
were cited among the factors that increased the probabil-
ity of a recession. The observation also was made that if
a recession developed, it was likely to be moderate and
short-lived.
The members expressed some differences of opinion con-
cerning prospects for prices. A significant easing from
the rapid rise of recent months was suggested, to the ex-
tent that recent increases in prices represented temporary
factors or were made in anticipation of possible price
and wage controls. Moreover, slackening of economic ac-
tivity later in the year could be expected to slow the rise
in prices generally. The view was also expressed, how-
ever, that inflation would remain rapid even during a
recession. In any case, it was observed, a long lag could
be expected in the response of prices to the additional
measures of restraint imposed toward the end of 1978.
In contemplating policy for the period immediately
ahead, the Committee continued to face unusual uncer-
tainties concerning the forces affecting monetary growth.
A staff analysis had suggested that Ml was likely to ex-
pand in March, contributing to a pickup in growth of
M2. Nevertheless, Ml was expected to register a decline
in the first quarter, on a quarterly average basis. It was
estimated that shifts of funds from demand deposits to
savings accounts with automatic transfer services and to
the NOW accounts in New York had depressed growth of
Ml by about 3 percentage points in the quarter. Moreover,
it appeared that growth of both Ml and M2 had been
affected by a downward shift in the public’s demand for
money in relation to income, although the magnitude of
that effect was uncertain.
In the Committee’s discussion, several members stressed
their concern about the shortfall in monetary growth rela-
tive to the longer-mn ranges that the Committee had
adopted at its meeting on February 6, 1979, especially
in view of the risks that a recession might develop in the
period ahead. Supporting the goal of bringing growth of
the monetary aggregates up into those ranges over a num-
ber of months, particularly because of the uncertainty
about the outlook for economic activity, they favored di-
recting operations in the period just after the meeting
toward maintaining the money market conditions currently
prevailing — as indicated by a federal funds rate of 10
percent or slightly higher — or toward a little less finn-
ness in those conditions. The objective of operations later
in the period before the next regular meeting of the
Committee would be determined on the basis of the in-
coming evidence on the behavior of the monetary aggre-
gates, although it \vas suggested that the Committee con-
sult again before any change was made in the operational
objective for the funds rate.
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Other members of the Committee emphasized the re-
cent acceleration 0f the rise in prices, and they believed
that action should be taken to demonstrate that inflation
represented the greatest risk to economic stability over a
period of time. Accordingly, they advocated directing ini-
tial operations in the period ahead toward a slight finning
in money market conditions, represented by an increase
in the objective for the federal funds rate to about 10¼
percent. Their prescription for operations later in the pe-
riod called for holding the objective for the funds rate
within a relatively narrow range.
TheManager was instructed to direct open marketopera-
lions initially toward maintaining the federal funds rate
at about the current level, represented by a rate of about
10 percent or slightly higher.
Meeting Held on April 17, 1979
Total credit at U.S. commercial banks expanded at a
much slower pace in March than in January and February,
as growth in real estate and business loans moderated
considerably and banks reduced their holdings of securi-
ties. However, commercial paper issued by nonfinancial
firms increased sharply, and the overall rate 0f short-term
business borrowing was maintained. For the first quarter
as a whole, nonfinancial businesses substantially increased
their borrowing in short- and intermediate-term markets.
At the same time, they reduced their public offerings of
bonds to the smallest quarterly total since 1973.
The narrowly defined money supply, Ml, grew some-
what in March after having declined in both January and
February. The broader monetary aggregates, M2 and M3,
expanded at relatively slow rates during the month, al-
though growth in both measures picked up somewhat from
thepace earlier in the year.
In late March and early April staff projections suggested
that over the March-April period Ml would grow at a
rate close to the lower limit of the range established by
the Committee and M2 at a rate just below the midpoint
of its range. These projections were not viewed as suffi-
ciently weak in relation to the Committee’s ranges to call
for a change in the federal funds rate objective of 10
percent or slightly higher.
Short-term interest rates fluctuated over a fairly wide
range during the intermeeting period and generally rose
a little on balance.
In the Committee’s discussion of the current economic
situation and outlook, attention \vas drawn to the indica-
tions of considerably slosver growth in real output of goods
and services in the first quarter of 1979 than had appeared
likely earlier. It was noted that residential construction
and consumer spending for goods had weakened more
than had been anticipated, and that such expansion as
had occurred in the first quarter apparently reflected
a substantial acceleration in the growth of business
inventories.
The members in general anticipated relatively slow
growth in economic activity for the near term, and some
believed that growth could remain at a sluggish pace for
many quarters. Many continued to believe that the proba-
bilities of a downturn in activity before the end of 1979
were fairly high, especially in view of the unusually long
duration of the current business expansion- It was also sug-
gested by some that a pickup in activity, based in part on
a surge in business demands for equipment and for inven-
tories, might occur and persist for a time before an even-
tual downturn.
As at other recent meetings, great concern was expressed
about inflation. It was observed that the rate of increase in
prices had tended to accelerate from year to year recently
and that there were few if any indications of a near-term
reversal in that momentum.
In contemplating policy for the period immediately
ahead, the Committee continued to face uncertainties con-
cerning the forces affecting monetary growth. A staff
analysis had suggested that Ml, after having registered
a decline in the first quarter, would expand over the
April-May period, reflecting in part rapid growth in nom-
inal GNP. It was anticipated that shifts of funds from
demand deposits to savings accounts with automatic trans-
fer services and to NOW accounts in New York State
would have a somewhat less dampening effect
on growth of Ml in the period immediately ahead
than in the first quarter. Moreover, it was assumed
that the public’s demand for money in relation
to income would continue to shift downward, but at
a sharply slower pace than in recent months. Thus, the
rise in the income velocity of Ml was expected to be
relatively rapid, but less than the unusually rapid rate of
the two most recent calendar quarters.
In the Committee’s discussion at this meeting, as at the
meeting on March 20, 1979, several members stressed
their concern about the degree of the shortfall in mone-
tary growth relative to the longer-run ranges that the Com-
mittee had adopted at its meeting on February 6. It was
observed that restrictive policy actions taken in late 1978
had contributed to the recent slowing of monetary growth
(after allowance for the impact of special factors) and
apparently also to a moderation of the expansion in eco-
nomic activity. Now, some easing in money market condi-
tions might be appropriate, with the objective of raising
growth of the monetary aggregates over a number of
months into the longer-run ranges and of helping to sup-
port economic activity later in the year.
However, an easing in money market conditions was
generally regarded as premature in the current environ-
ment of rapidly rising prices, although it was felt that
nsonetary policy could bave little if any immediate effect
on prices of food, energy, and housing items, which had
been largely responsible for the recent acceleration of the
overall rise, Given the staff expectation of a near-term
strengthening of monetary growth, most members advo-
cated or found acceptable a policy of directing operations
early in the period immediately ahead toward maintaining
the money market conditions currently prevailing .
and of having the objective for operations later
in the period before the next regular meeting determined
on the basis of incoming evidence on rates of growth of the
monetary aggregates over the April-May period in relation
to the growth rates currently anticipated.
A few members advocated an immediate increase in the
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objective for the federal funds rate to 10¾percent or
10½ percent and arange for subsequent operations provid-
ing for a further increase in the funds rate if incoming
evidence suggested relative strength in growth of the mon-
eta~yaggregates. They stressed the recent acceleration in
the rise in prices and high rates of resource use, and they
continued to believe that action should be taken to dem-
onstrate that inflation represented the greatest risk to eco-
nomic stability over a period of thne, In their view, in-
flationary expectations had increased over recent months
while interest rates on balance had changed little. In the
current circumstances, moreover, they attached little sig-
nificance to the behavior 0f the monetary aggregates.
Meeting Held on May 22, 1979
Total credit outstanding at U.S. commercial banks grew
rapidly in April, as it had on balance during the first
quarter of the year. The April growth was lead by a re-
bound in expansion of business loans, which had slack-
ened in March from rapid rates in January and February.
Commercial paper issued by nonfinancial firms increased
sharply in April for the second consecutive month.
The narrowly defined money supply, Ml, expanded
sharply in April, after having declined on the average in
the first quarter. A substantial part of the April increase
was attributable to delays in the Treasury’s processing of
checks in payment of federal income taxes and to bunch-
ing of tax refunds, Reflecting in part the behavior of Ml,
growth of M2 and M3 accelerated to rapid rates in April
from relatively slow rates in the first quarter.
In late April projections suggested that over the April-
May period Ml and M2 would grow at rates that were
close to or above the upper limits of their respective
ranges. In accordance with the directive issued at the
meeting on April 17, operations were directed toward an
increase in the federal funds rate to a level of about 10¼
percent. Subsequently, in early May, the two-month rates
of growth projected for Ml and M2 ‘vere somewhat
stronger. However, financial markets appeared to be in a
sensitive state, and recent developments affecting supplies
and distribution of energy were adding to uncertainties
about economic prospects. Moreover, it appeared that the
rapid pace of monetary growth was attributable in part to
transitory forces. In the circumstances, and in view of the
directive’s instruction to give due regard to developing
conditions in domestic financial markets, the objective for
the federal funds rate was maintained at 10¼percent.
Short-term interest rates in general changed little on
balance during the intermeeting period.
In the Committee’s discussion of the economic situa-
tion and outlook, the members in general agreed that the
pace of expansion in economic activity had slowed signifi-
cantly, apart from the effects of severe weather in the first
quarter and of the work stoppage in the trucking industry
early in the current quarter. ...A number of members
now thought that a cyclical peak in activity might well be
registered in the current quarter.
Despite the current risks of recession in activity, the
slowing of the expansion from the excessively rapid pace
in late 1978 was regarded as a desirable development, in
view of the inflationary pressures that had been accumu-
lating. It was noted that some reduction in growth of
nominal CNP had been an objective of the restrictive pol-
icy actions taken last autumn, although the reduction had
so far been reflected in growth of real CNP rather than in
the rate ofinflation.
Members continued to express great concern about in-
flation. , ..According to a number of economic projec-
tions, moreover, deceleration of inflation would be a slow
and lengthy process. The observation was made that if
the rate 0f inflation was not sharply reduced in the months
immediately ahead, renewed expansion in business activ-
ity would begin with prices rising at a relatively fast pace.
In contemplating policy for the period immediately
ahead, the Committee took note of a staff analysis sug-
gesting that over the May-June period growth of Ml
would be quite slow, in part because of the unwinding of
the transitory effects of federal income tax payments and
refunds that had contributed to its exceptionally rapid
growth in April. It was expected that growth of M2 over
the two-month period would be retarded by the slow
growth of Ml but that growth of the interest-bearing com-
ponent would remain relatively strong.
Most members of the Committee believed that, despite
increasing signs of weakening in economic activity and
the risks of recession, a general easing in monetary re-
straint at this time would be premature in view of the
continuance of strong inflationary pressures. Given the staff
expectations of slow growth in Ml and M2 over the May-
June period, they favored a policy of directing open mar-
ket operations early in the period immediately ahead to-
ward maintaining the money market conditions currently
prevailing .. .and of having the objective for operations
later in the period before the next meeting determined on
the basis of incoming evidence on the behavior of the
monetary aggregates in relation to that currently antici-
pated. In view of uncertainties concerning interpretation
of credit conditions and monetary growth in the current
environment, they also favored specifying unusually wide
ranges for growth of Ml and M2 over the May-June
period and giving greater weight than usual to money
market conditions in the conduct of operations until the
next meeting.
Subsequent to the meeting, on June 15, incoming data
indicated that Ml and M2 were growing at exceptionally
rapid rates in early June, and projections suggested that
for the May-June period both monetary aggregates would
grow at annual rates above the tipper limits of the ranges
that had been specified by the Committee, .. . However,
in vie\v of many indications of weakening in economic
activity, the difficulties 0f interpreting the behavior of the
aggregates in the light of these circumstances, the condi-
tion of financial markets, and the general uncertainty about
the economic outlook, Chairman Miller recommended that
the Manager be instructed to continue to aim for a federal
funds rate of about 10¼percent.
Meeting Held on July 11, 1979
Total credit outstanding at U.S. commercial banks con-
tinued to expand rapidly in May and June, but the rate
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of growth for the two months combined was down some-
what from the average pace in earlier months of the
year. Increases in bank loans during May and June were
concentrated in the business and real estate categories.
Commercial paper issued by nonfinancial firms rose con-
siderably further overthe two months.
The narrowly defined money supply, Ml, increased
sharply in June and the broader measures of money, M2
and M3, also grew rapidly..
Federal funds traded somewhat above the Committee’s
objective in late June and early July, in response to pres-
sures associated with unusual churning in the money mar-
ket around the midyear bank statement date and the
July 4 holiday.
Most interest rates other than the federal funds rate
fell substantially on balance during the intermeeting pe-
riod. The declines appeared to be in response to the grow-
ing evidence that economic activity had been weakening.
With respect to the economic situation and outlook, no
member of the Committee expressed disagreement with
the staff appraisal that real gross national product had de-
clined somewhat in the second quarter and that further
declines were likely for the remaining two quarters of the
year. The suggestion was made that the recession was
most likely to be mild and short-lived. However, it could
prove to be more severe than currently expected because
the recent increases in prices of energy items and inflation
generally were reducing disposable income and eroding
the financial position of the household sector.
Another reason advanced for thinking that the recession
could be more severe was the possibility that the down-
turn in economic activity would become widespread
among industrial countries.
Members continued to express great concern about in-
flation. It was suggested that the unexpectedly large in-
creases in OPEC oil prices in late June had seriously
harmed the government’s anti-inflation efforts. Thus, wind-
ing down the rate of increase in prices might well take
considerably longer than had been thought earlier and
would be more costly in terms of its impact on output,
employment, and real income.
In the discussion of policy for the period immediately
ahead, members of the Committee in general favored di-
recting open market operations initially toward maintain-
ing the money market conditions currently prevailing
on the expectation thatover the July-August period growth
of Ml and M2 would be both moderate and consistent
with their longer-run ranges. Some sentiment was ex-
pressed for a near-term reduction in the federal funds
rate because of the downturn in economic activity, but it
was agreed that current conditions in foreign exchange
markets militated against a prompt reduction.
About a week after the meeting, on July 19, projections
suggested that over the July-August period Ml would
grow at an annual rate moderately above the upper limit
of the range of 2½ to 6½ percent that had been specified
by the Committee and that M2 would grow at a rate about
equal to the upper limit of its range of 6¼to 10½per-
cent; in those circumstances, the Manager began to aim
for a weekly average federal funds rate at about the 10½
percent upper limit of its range. On July 27, with the pro-
jections suggesting that growth of both Ml and M2 over
the July-August period would exceed the upper limits of
their ranges and with the objective for the federal funds
rate at the upper limit of its range, the Committee voted
to modify the directive adopted at the meeting on July
11. Specifically, the Committee raised the upper limit of
the intermeeting range for the federal funds rate to 10¾
percent and instructed the Manager to aim for a rate
within a range of 10¼to 1Q¾ percent, depending on sub-
sequentbehavior of the monetary aggregates, on conditions
in foreign exchange markets, and on the current Treasury
financing.
Meeting Held on August 14, 1979
Expansion of total credit outstanding at U.S. commercial
banks, which had picked up in June, moderated in July
to about the April-May pace. Growth in loans also mod-
erated in July after an acceleration in June. Banks con-
tinued to add sizable amounts to their holdings of securi-
ties, especially U.S. government obligations. Growth in
commercial paper issued by nonfinancial firms exceeded
the strong second-quarter pace, owing in part to large sales
by foreign issuers.
The monetary aggregates — Ml, M2, and M3 — con-
tinued to expand rapidly in July.
In the Committee’s discussion of the economic situation
and outlook, none of the members expressed disagreement
with the staff appraisal that real gross national product
was continuing to decline in the current quarter. How-
ever, members expressed considerable uncertainty about
the duration and extent of the decline in activity.
Members continued to express great concern about in-
flation. It was observed that for a long period elements
in the economic situation had seemed to justify expecta-
tions of a reduction in the rise in prices. Such expectations
had been disappointed. Moreover, little reduction could
be expected in the short run because recent increases in
energy prices had not yet fully worked through the price
structure. It was noted that the decline in the rate of
inflation projected for the quarters immediately ahead was
small, and much smaller than that associated with thepre-
vious recession. Thus, inflation might still be at a high rate
when economic activity turned up again. Inflationary ex-
pectations appeared to have worsened in the sense that,
more than ever before, consumers and businessmen seemed
to take the inflationary environment into account in mak-
ing spending and investing decisions.
In considering policy for the period immediately ahead,
Committee members focused on the problems posed by
emerging recession and its potential for substantial in-
creases in unemployment, concurrent with strong mone-
tary growth, high actual and expected rates of inflation,
and an exposed position of the dollar in foreign exchange
markets pending anticipated improvement in the U.S. for-
eign trade and current accounts.
There was little disagreement with the proposition that
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for the near term modest measures should be taken to
direct policy toward slowing growth 0f the monetary ag-
gregates. Control of monetary growth was regarded as
essential to restore expectations of a decline in the rate
of inflation overa period of time.
In support of modest measures directed toward restraint,
it was suggested that monetary policy recently had not
been so restrictive as it might have appeared. Monetary
growth since the beginning of the year had been con-
siderably greater than that indicated by Ml, owing to
rapid expansion in close substitutes for demand deposits
and currency. In addition, the increase in interest rates
had been less than that in expected rates of inflation.
On the other hand, it was noted that interest rates were
close to historic highs. Some doubt was expressed, more-
over, that further restraint could have a significant effect
on inflation, particularly in view of the role of energy in
the rapid rate of increase in prices recently. In the face
of clear evidence of weakening in economic activity, it
was observed, the need to balance the objective of con-
taining the recession with the goal of moderating infla-
tion called for a steady policy for the time being.
In considering policy specifications for the period im-
mediately ahead, the Committee took note of a staff analy-
sis suggesting that the current growth rate of nominal
GNP and other influences, including possibly a temporary
accumulation of precautionary balances by the public in
response to unusual uncertainties, were tending to sup-
port the demand for money. On the assumption of con-
tinuance of prevailing money market conditions, therefore,
growth of both Ml and M2 over the August-September
period most likely would be high relative to the Com-
mittee’s longer-run ranges, although growth could be ex-
pected to slow substantially from the rapid rates of recent
months.
At the conclusion of its discussion of policy, the Com-
mittee decided to instruct the Manager for Domestic op-
erations to direct open market operations initially toward
an increase in the weekly average federal funds rate to
about 11 percent.
Subsequent to the meeting, in late August, incoming
data indicated that Ml and M2 were growing at rapid
rates in August. On August 30, projections for the August-
September period suggested that growth of Ml would be
at an annual rate well above the upper limit of the range
that had been specified by the Committee and that growth
of M2 would be at about the tipper limit of its range.
Over the preceding week, the Manager for Domestic, op-
erations had been aiming for a weekly average federal
funds rate approaching the 11¾percent upper limit of its
specified range, and in the statement week ending August
29, the rate averaged 11.16 percent. In these circum-
stances, Chairman Volcker recommended that the tipper
limit of the range for the funds i-ate be raised to 11½
percent, but with the understanding that not all of the
additional leeway would be used immediately; use of the
leeway ‘vould depend on subsequent behavior of the
monetary aggregates and on developments in foreign ex-
change markets, The Committee voted to amend the
domestic policy directive in accordance with the Chair-
man’s recommendation.
Meeting Held on September 18, 1979
Total credit outstanding at U.S. commercial banks grew
more slowly in August than in most earlier months of the
year. Banks’ holdings of Treasury obligations declined
and growth in their total loans moderated. However, busi-
ness loans continued to expand rapidly in August and
commercial paper issued by nonfinancial firms again in-
creased sharply.
The monetary aggregates — Ml, M2, and MS — con-
tinued to expand at relatively rapid rates in August and
early September, although somewhat less rapidly than in
June and July.
Short-term interest rates rose substantially during the
intermeeting period, in response to strong business de-
mands for credit as well as to the System’s actions firming
money market conditions and to expectations of further
monetary restraint. Bond yields also increased somewhat.
In the Committee’s discussion of the economic situation
and outlook, none of the members expressed disagreement
with the staff appraisal of some further contraction in
real gross national product after the current quarter’s in-
terruption of the decline. However, members continued
to express uncertainty about the duration and extent of
the contraction in activity.
Members continued to express great concern about the
rapid rise in prices. It was observed that inflation was
more persistent now than it had been in earlier periods of
some ‘weakening in demands and that there was still a
tendency to underestimate its strength. Furthermore, the
current and foreseeable rate of inflation could itself lead
to additional shocks to the economy.
In contemplating policy for the period immediately
ahead, Committee members took note of a staff analysis
suggesting that growth of Ml \vas likely to taper off dur-
ing the September-October period in response to the
lagged effects of the substantial increase in interest rates
during the summer and the prospective weakening of ex-
pansion in nominal GNP. However, growth over the two
months would still be relatively high.
Members who favored policy measures directed toward
some additional firming in money market conditions
stressed the importance of achieving a significant reduc-
tion in the pace of monetary expansion over the months
ahead. Such a reduction \vas necessary if growth over the
year ending in the fourth quarter of 1979 was to be held
well within the longer-run ranges that had been reaffinned
by the Committee in July. Additional measures to restrain
monetary growth, moreover, would tend to lower expected
rates of inilation and, consequently, would have a con-
structive influence on a range of decisions affecting prices
and wages as well as the value of the dollar in foreign
exchange markets.
It was suggested, in addition, that monetary policy had
not been as restrictive as it might have appeared. Despite
the level of interest rates, credit demands and credit ex-
pansion remained strong. Interest rates after allowance for
expected rates of inflation \vere not high. Furthennore,
monetary growth this year had been greater than indicated
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by Ml alone, owing to rapid expansion in close substi-
tutes for demand deposits and currency.
In support of a policy directed toward maintenance for
the lime being of prevailing money market conditions,
members emphasized the substantial rise in interest rates
over the past two months and the tendency of changes in
rates to affect monetary growth and economic activity only
after a considerable lag. In this connection, it was ob-
served that growth of demand deposits had slowed mark-
edly in July and August, while expansion of Ml had been
supported by an unexplained pickup in growth of cur-
rency in circulation. Growth of the monetary aggregates
was likely to taper off in coming months, and additional
firming in money market conditions might slow growth to
an unwanted degree. In the current circumstances, the
Committee should avoid policy actions that might inten-
sify the developing weakness in economic activity.
At the conclusion of its discussion of policy, the Com-
mittee decided to instruct the Manager for Domestic Op-
erations to direct open market operations initially toward
a slight increase in the weekly average federal funds rate
to about11¼ percent.
Meeting Held on October 8, 1979
This meeting of the Committee was called by the Chair-
man to consider actions that might be taken, in conjunc-
tion with actions being contemplated by the Board of
Governors, to improve control overthe expansion of money
and bank credit in the light of developing speculative ex-
cesses in financial and commodity markets and additional
evidence of strong inflationary forces in the economy.
Special attention was given to the conduct of open mar-
ket operations in order to contain growth in the monetary
aggregates within the ranges previously adopted by the
Committee for the \-ear ending in the fourth quarter of
1979.
The information available at the time of the meeting
suggested somewhat stronger economic activity in the third
quarter than had been indicated at the time of the Com-
mittee’s meeting on September 18, and real output of
goods and services was estimated to have recovered a sig-
nificant part of the second-quarter decline. According to
staff projections, however, a decline in activity in the
fourth quarter still appeared probable. Prices on the aver-
age were continuing to rise somewhat more rapidly than
anticipated earlier, in part because of additional large in-
creases in energy items and renewed upward pressures on
foods. Moreover, developments in spot and futures mar-
kets for a number of commodities were indicative of an
intensification of speculative activity and of the possibility
of a further surge in prices.
In foreign exchange markets the weighted average value
of the dollar against major foreign currencies had de-
clined substantially since the Committee’s meeting in mid-
September, and monetary autborities had purchased, net,
a large amount ofdollars.
Interest rates had remained under considerable upward
pressure since mid-September, and most yields had risen
to new highs for the year.
The monetary aggregates — Ml and M2 — continued
to expand at rapid rates in September, and growth in bank
credit appeared to have accelerated appreciably from its
pace in the prior two months.
In the Committee’s discussion of policy for the period
immediately ahead, the members agreed that the current
situation called for additional measures to restrain growth
of the monetary aggregates over the months ahead. The
members felt that growth of the aggregates at rates within
the ranges previously established for 1979 remained a
reasonable and feasible objective in the light of the avail-
able information and the business outlook, Given that ob-
jective, most members strongly supported a shift in the
conduct of open market operations to an approach placing
emphasis on supplying the volume of bank reserves esti-
mated to be consistent with the desired rates of growth
in monetary aggregates, while permitting much greater
fluctuations in the federal funds rate than heretofore, A
few members, while urging strong action to restrain mon-
etary growth, expressed some preference for continuing
to direct daily open market operations toward maintenance
of levels of the federal funds rate and other short-term in-
terest rates that appeared to be consistent with the Com-
mittee’s objectives for growth in the monetary aggregates.
The advantages and disadvantages of the different ap-
proaches were discussed.
The principal reason advanced for shifting to an operat-
ing procedure aimed at controlling the supply of bank
reserves more directly was that it would provide greater
assurance that the Committee’s objectives for monetary
growth could be achieved. In the present enviromnent of
rapid inflation, estimates of the relationship among interest
rates, monetary growth, and economic activity had become
less reliable than before, and monetary growth since the
first quarter of 1979 had exceeded the rates expected de-
spite substantial increases in short-term interest rates.
Committee members recognized that for a number of rea-
sons the relationship between growth of various reserve
measures and growth of the monetary aggregates was not
precise; thus the shift in emphasis to controlling reserves
improved prospects for achievement of the Committee’s
objectives for monetary growth over the next few months
but did not assureit.
Committee members suggested that the shift in operat-
ing techniques, along with the other actions being con-
templated by the Board of Governors, would tend to
increase confidcnce at home and abroad in the System’s de-
termination to achieve its objectives for monetary growth
and to avoid further deterioration in the inflationary out-
look, Partly because it would increase uncertainty about
the near-term course of interest rates, the new operating
technique should induce banks to exercise greater caution
in extending credit and might dampen speculative beha-
vior by increasing its risks and costs. Altogether, the
System’s action would tend to moderate inflationary ex-
pectations, thereby exerting a constructive influence over
time on decisions affecting wages and prices in domestic
markets and on the value of the dollar in foreign ex-
change markets.
The observation was made that the new emphasis in
open market operations might be accompanied by larger
increases in interest rates in the immediate future than
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would otherwise occur. On the other hand, the emphasis
on reserves also could be expected to produce a shift
toward easier conditions in money markets more promptly
whenever the demand for money and credit abated sig-
nificantly in response to a weakening in economic activity.
The point was made that an easing in money market con-
ditions under circumstances in which growth of monetary
aggregates was restrained, economic activity was weak-
ening, and the rise in prices was moderating should not
adversely affect inflationary expectations and the value of
the dollar in foreign exchange markets.
At the conclusion of the discussion and after full consid-
eration of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative
courses of action, the Committee agreed that in the con-
duct of open market operations over the remainder of
1979 the Manager for Domestic Operations should place
primary emphasis on restraining expansion of bank re-
serves in pursuit of the Committee’s objective of decel-
erating growth of Ml, M2, and MS to rates that would
hold growth of these monetary aggregates over the year
from the fourth quarter of 1978 to the fourth quarter of
1979 within the Committee’s ranges for that period.
Subsequently, on October 22, 1979, the Committee held
a telephone conference to review the situation and to con-
sider whether supplementary instructions to the Manager
were needed. Since October 6, expansion of total reserves
had exceeded the pace consistent with the Committee’s
objective for growth of the monetary aggregates during
the fourth quarter. At the same time, the federal funds
rate had begun fluctuating close to the upper limit of the
11½ to 15½ percent range established by the Committee.
It was recognized that the desired restraint in the expan-
sion of total reserves might involve continued pressure on
money market conditions, including higher levels of mem-
ber bank borrowings from the Federal Reserve than had
been anticipated, as banks made orderly adjustments that
would in time slow monetary growth. It was not clear,
however, that retention of the 15½ percent upper limit 0f
the range for the federal funds rate would be inconsistent
with the desired restraint on monetary growth. Moreover,
unsettled conditions in financial markets also suggested no
change in the upper limit of the range for the federal
funds rate. Consequently, no change was proposed in
the domestic policy directive issued at the meeting on
October 6.
Meeting Held on November 20, 1979
Over the first half of October, measures of bank reserves
in general grew faster than had been anticipated at the
time of the meeting on October 6, both because demands
for reserves were unexpectedly strong and because System
operations provided more reserves than had been expected.
Subsequently, System operations were directed more firmly
at restraining growth of reserves. As such operations lim-
ited growth of nonborrowed reserves while demands for
reserves remained strong, member bank borrowings rose
to a daily average of about $3 billion in the last two
statement weeks of October and the federal funds rate
rose to an average a little above 15½percent in the final
week. In the first half of November, demands for reserves
eased, and member bank borrowings subsided to a daily
average of about $2 billion and the federal funds rate
declined to an average of about 13¼percent.
Growth of MI, which had accelerated in September
and had been exceptionally rapid in the third quarter as
a whole, slowed to an annual rate of 2¼percent in Oc-
tober. Growth of M2 slowed less than that of Ml, to a
rate of about 8¼percent in October, as overall expan-
sion in the interest-bearing components remained strong.
A marked rise of net flows into money market certificates
and other time deposits at commercial banks, fostered by
substantially higher deposit yields, offset a sharp reduction
in savings deposits.
Growth in loans and investments at commercial banks
moderated appreciably in October,
Since early October interest rates had risen sharply in
both short- and long-term markets and had been unusually
volatile.
In foreign exchange markets the downward pressure on
the dollar that had developed in September was reversed
in early October, and by the end of the month, the trade-
‘veighted value of the dollar against major foreign cur-
rencies had risen about 3½percent. Around mid-Novem-
ber, however, the dollar came under renewed downward
pressure and lost a portion of its October gain, in part
reflecting developments relating to Iran.
In the Committee’s discussion of the economic situation
and outlook, the members in general agreed with the staff
appraisal that the unexpectedly strong rebound in real
gross national product in the third quarter would be fol-
lowed by some contraction in activity and by a rise in
unemployment, although uncertainty was expressed about
the depth and duration of the anticipated downturn as
well as about its precise timing. Some members cited the
onset of the heating season with energy prices so much
higher than a year earlier, the overall rate of inflation,
the recent sharp rise in interest rates, and the developing
stringency in some financial markets as influences that
might cause the contraction to be relatively severe.
Continuation of the rapid rise in prices of goods and
services remained a major concern of Committee mem-
bers, some of whom thought that the risks were on the
side of a rise greater than that currently anticipated. The
prospects for supplies and prices of oil, which would have
a substantial effect on the economy, were regarded as es-
pecially uncertain, in view of the political situation in Iran
and of the meeting of petroleum-exporting countries sched-
uled to begin on December 17.
In contemplating policy for the period immediately
ahead, the Committee took note of a staff analysis indi-
cating that the behavior of the monetary aggregates since
September had been reasonably consistent with the policy
adopted on October 6 ..
In the Committee’s discussion of policy for the period
immediately ahead, the members indicated that in the
present circumstances pursuit of the goal of restraining
growth of the monetary aggregates from the fourth quar-
ter of 1978 to the fourth quarter of 1979 within the
ranges previously established for that period remained
feasible and desirable; they agreed that in pursuit of that
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underlying goal, the broad objectives for monetary growth
during the current quarter adopted at the meeting on Oc-
tober 6 were still appropriate. In contemplating objectives
for rates of monetary growth over the weeks through the
end of 1979 and into January 1980, the members differed
somewhat in their views concerning the extent to which
operations should be directed toward promoting accelera-
tion in growth of MI from the recently reduced rates. A
few members favored operations consistent with the Oc-
tober 6 decision to seek a 4¼percent annual rate of
growth in Ml over the September-December period. A
few members favored acceptance of a significantly slower
rate of growth for the quarter. Most members, however,
advocated a compromise between those two prescriptions.
It was recognized that, while the decision affecting such a
short period would have quite minor implications for mon-
etary growth over the year ending in the fourth quarter of
1979, it would affect credit and money market conditions
in the weeks ahead and the path of monetary growth en-
tering the new year.
Views with respect to an acceptable range of fluctua-
tion for the federal funds rate did not vary greatly. It was
agreed that the range should continue to be relatively
wide, and most members indicated a preference for re-
taining the range of 11½to 15½percent adopted at the
October 6 meeting.
Meeting Held on January 8-9, 1980
Over the first four weeks after the November meeting,
both total and nonborrowed reserves grew at about the
rates projected at the time of the meeting. Member bank
borrowings averaged about $1% billion, compared with
an average of slightly less than $2 billion in the preced-
ing three weeks, and the federal funds rate continued to
average around 13½ percent. Toward the end of the four-
week period, however, the demand for reserves appeared
to be easing relative to the path consistent with desired
monetary growth. In the three weeks remaining before this
meeting, member bank borrowings declined to a daily
average of about $1.1 billion. Despite the decline in bor-
rowings, the federal funds rate edged up to an average of
about 14 percent in late December and early January, at
least in part because of exceptionally large demands for
excess reserves around the year-end holidays.
Expansion in the major monetary aggregates remained
at a reduced pace in November and December, after hav-
ing slowed markedlyin October.
Growth in total loans and investments at commercial
banks slowed sharply in the fourth quarter. Slower expan-
sion was especially pronounced in business loans. Growth
in real estate loans remained close to the pace in the first
three quarters of the year.
Since the November meeting of the Committee, interest
rates had fluctuated over a relatively wide range, although
they had been somewhat less volatile than in the previous
intermeeting period. On balance, most interest rates had
declined.
Staff projections suggested that growth of nominal gross
national product would slow considerably in the current
quarter and then pick up gradually over the remainder
of 1980. The projections suggested, however, that a con-
traction in real GNP would develop in the current quarter
and would continue later in the year, although at a di-
minishing pace in the second half, and that the rate of
unemployment would increase substantially. The rise in
average prices was projected to accelerate slightly during
the early part of 1980, mainly because of increases in
energy costs, but to subside later.
In the Committee’s consideration of the economic out-
look, several members stressed the elements of uncertainty
in the current situation. The observation was made that the
relationships of the past appeared to provide less guidance
than usual in appraising the current situation and outlook.
In the later part of 1979, for example, overall activity had
been unexpectedly strong and the widely anticipated re-
cession had not developed, although automobile produc-
tion and housing starts had declined. In the judgment of
a number of members, a downturn now seemed to be
getting under way, but there was also recognition that it
could be delayed for another quarter or two.
Inflation remained a major concern. In part because of
earlier increases in oil prices and in mortgage interest
rates, the consumer price indexes to be published in the
next few months probably would continue to show excep-
tionally large advances.
In the discussion of policy for the near term, the mem-
bers in general considered rates of monetary growth for
the three months from December to March within the
framework of some reduction in ranges for growth over
the whole of 1980 from those for 1979 in pursuit of the
Committee’s objective of reducing the rate of inflation.
The Committee also took note of a staff analysis indi-
cating that the demand for money could be relatively
weak in the first quarter of 1980, if growth of nominal
GNP did in fact slow sharply, and could strengthen as
the yearprogressed.
Differences in views concerning the particular rates of
monetary growth to be specified for the period from De-
cember to March were not great. Preferences were ex-
pressed for growth indexed by expansion in Ml at an an-
nual rate of 4 percent, a rate of 5 percent, and something
between the two.
With respect to the acceptable range of fluctuation for
the federal funds rate, almost all members preferred to
retain the range of 11½ to 15½ percent, originally adopted
at the meeting on October 6, 1979, and continued at the
meeting on November 20. One member suggested raising
the range slightly, to 12 to 16 percent.
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